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Abstract
In this paper we estimate infl ation expectations for several Latin American countries using 
an affi ne model that takes as factors the observed infl ation and the parameters generated 
from zero-coupon yield curves of nominal bonds. By implementing this approach, we avoid 
the use of infl ation-linked securities, which are scarce in many of these markets, and obtain 
market measures of infl ation expectations free of any risk premium, eliminating potential 
biases included in other measures such as breakeven rates. Our method provides several 
advantages, as we can compute infl ation expectations at any horizon and forward rates 
such as the expected infl ation over the fi ve year period that begins fi ve years from today. 
We fi nd that infl ation expectations in the long-run are fairly anchored in Chile and Mexico, 
while those in Brazil and Colombia are more volatile and less anchored. We also fi nd that 
expected infl ation increases at longer horizons in Brazil and Chile, while it is decreasing in 
Colombia and Mexico. 
Keywords: infl ation expectations, affi ne model, real interest rate, risk premium.
JEL classifi cation: G12, E43, E44, C54.
Resumen
En este trabajo se obtiene una estimación de las expectativas de infl ación para varios 
países de América Latina utilizando un modelo afín, que incluye como factores la infl ación 
observada y los parámetros generados a partir de las curvas de rendimientos cupón cero 
sobre bonos soberanos nominales. El uso de esta metodología evita utilizar los precios 
de productos fi nancieros indexados a la infl ación, que son escasos en muchos de estos 
países, y además obtener expectativas de infl ación sin ninguna prima de riesgo, lo que 
elimina sesgos que sí estarían presentes en otras medidas, como los break-even rates. Se 
pueden obtener también expectativas de infl ación a cualquier plazo y tasas futuras, como, 
por ejemplo, la infl ación esperada sobre el período de cinco años que comienza dentro de 
cinco años. Los resultados muestran que las expectativas de infl ación en el largo plazo 
se encuentran bien ancladas en Chile y México, mientras que en Brasil y Colombia el 
grado de anclaje es menor. Además, la infl ación esperada se incrementa para plazos más 
largos en Brasil y Chile, ocurriendo lo contrario en Colombia y México.
Palabras clave: expectativas de infl ación, modelos afi nes, tipo de interés real, prima a plazo.
Códigos JEL: G12, E43, E44, C54.
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1. Introduction 
Agents' inflation expectations are decisive when studying changes in many of the 
variables shaping households' and firms' decision making. One approach to obtain 
inflation expectations is based on the consensus view of specialist economic forecasters, 
such as the surveys of professional forecasters by the European Central Bank and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, both of which are released quarterly. Other surveys 
also exist, such as the monthly University of Michigan Survey of Consumers in the United 
States, which elicits information from consumers rather than professional economic 
forecasters. In Latin America, several central banks also publishes surveys about inflation 
expectations1. A drawback of these surveys is that they are released relatively infrequently 
and, thus, the information received has a time lag. Moreover, they only cover a small 
range of time horizons and, as identified in the literature (Ang et al., 2007; Chan et al., 
2013), there is some bias and inertia in their responses. 
An alternative way of obtaining agents' inflation expectations is to use prices of market-
traded financial instruments employed to hedge against inflation such us inflation-linked 
bonds, inflation swaps and inflation options. One may argue that given that investors risk 
their funds when taking investment decisions based on expected future inflation and 
professional forecasters do not have any vested interest, they could provide a better 
forecast since they have more skin in the game. Another advantage to this approach is 
that it is possible to derive the whole probability function (Gimeno and Ibáñez, 2018). 
This makes it possible to estimate, for example, the probability of the occurrence of 
certain extreme events or the uncertainty of future inflation. Another additional advantage 
in comparison with surveys is that changes in expectations can be observed almost in real 
time. This makes it easier to identify the effect of specific events or decisions on inflation 
expectations. Unfortunately, there are not many markets of inflation-linked securities 
available for most countries. For example, in Latin American only a few have inflation-
linked bonds and there are no markets for inflation options at all. Another problem of 
obtaining inflation expectations using this approach is the presence of various risk premia, 
which are included in the prices of the underlying financial assets and which may also 
vary over time. The presence of these premia may distort the information content of these 
indicators, which may affect measures of agents' inflation expectations. 
Due to the lack of inflation-linked securities in Latin American markets, we use an 
alternative approach developed by Gimeno and Marques (2012) to obtain inflation 
expectations: an affine model that takes as factors the observed inflation and the 
parameters generated in the zero-coupon yield curve estimation of nominal bonds. Also, 
by implementing this approach, we obtain a measure of inflation expectations free of any 
risk premia, since the model breaks down nominal interest rates as the sum of real risk-
free interest rates, expected inflation, and the risk premium. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to obtain pure inflation expectations 
using nominal government bonds for Latin American countries. We obtain government 
bond data for Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, being able to estimate the zero-coupon 
yield curve and decompose that curve into the real risk-free rate, the risk premia, and 
                                                          
1 For example the central banks of Chile, Colombia and Mexico publish a monthly survey about inflation 
expectations; the Bank of Brazil publishes a daily survey. 
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inflation expectations. We can obtain inflation expectations for all of horizons computed 
in the zero-coupon yield curve as well as forward rates such as the expected inflation over 
the five year period that begins five years from today (the 5Y5Y forward rate). We find 
that inflation expectations in the long-term (5Y5Y) seem to be anchored in Chile and 
Mexico, although the level of expected inflation is above the central bank target rate of 
3%.On the other hand long-term inflation expectations in Brazil and Colombia are more 
volatile and have been fluctuating over time, experiencing a large decrease during 2017. 
These results may also point out that government bond markets in Brazil and Colombia 
do not provide as much information about future inflation as the other markets. 
We also find the expected inflation is currently increasing with the horizon in Brazil and 
Chile, while it is decreasing in Colombia and Mexico. For Mexico, there has been an 
important shock on expected inflation after the last US presidential elections, 
experiencing a large increase. None of the other countries analyzed have shown this 
pattern, limiting the spill-overs effects of the results of the US presidential elections to 
inflation expectations in Mexico. Finally, we compare the forecasting power over 1 year 
of inflation expectations obtained using our approach with expected inflation obtained 
from surveys. Our approach performs better predicting inflation for Chile, while surveys 
do better for Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Further analysis shows that inflation 
expectations from our model complement those from surveys and provide additional 
information. A simple average of the expected inflation obtained using our approach and 
expected inflation from surveys provides a better fit that using only expectations from 
surveys for all countries but Brazil. Overall there is a trade-off between the two ways of 
obtaining expected inflations, as surveys are less responsive to inflation shocks and our 
approach produces expected inflation levels that are more correlated with current 
inflation. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the financial instruments from which 
information about inflation expectations can be derived, analyzing their availability for 
Latin American Markets. Section III summarizes the main features of the affine model 
we implement to obtain inflation expectations and Section IV shows the results. Section 
V concludes. 
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2. Financial instruments with information about inflation expectations 
 
 
2.1. Inflation Linked Bonds 
One of the most popular metrics of inflation expectations based on financial asset prices 
is the one obtained from inflation-linked bonds (breakeven inflation rates). This is 
calculated by comparing the yield of a conventional bond (whose associated coupon and 
principal payments are fixed in nominal terms), with that of an inflation-linked bond 
(indexed to a price index) of the same maturity from the same issuer. 
The inflation-linked bond market is particularly active in the United States, where these 
assets (known as Treasury inflation-protected securities or TIPS) are issued in sufficient 
quantity to create a liquid market in which price formation is fluid. However, the situation 
in Europe is fragmentized due to the existence of multiple issuers (namely the traditional 
issuer of treasuries for France, Italy, and Germany, and the less frequent issuer Greece, 
later joined by Spain in 2014) and the use of different consumer price indices (national 
and European) as a reference. These factors reduce liquidity and are an obstacle to 
obtaining a clear signal on the compensation demanded by investors for the expected 
increases in the cost of living. In Latin America, there are several markets of inflation-
linked bonds in countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. 
Besides the lack of market depth and liquidity, an additional problem with this indicator 
is that it includes other components as well as investors' expectations about future price 
developments. Firstly, given that investors are averse to inflation risk, they will demand 
a premium on conventional bonds that compensates them for the risk incurred, but not on 
inflation-linked bonds, as they are protected against this risk. For this reason, the indicator 
does not strictly measure the level of expectations, but rather the compensation for 
inflation that investors demand. Secondly, the different level of liquidity of the two 
instruments used to obtain the indicator (generally higher for conventional bonds than 
inflation-linked ones), means the yield spread between them is also influenced by their 
different liquidity premiums. As well as the aforementioned inflation-related factors, 
conventional bonds include a component reflecting the expected future course of the real 
interest rate, together with its associated risk premium. Finally, it should be borne in mind 
that the size of the premia present in the break-even rate (inflation risk and relative 
liquidity) may change over time, depending on changes in investors' risk appetite, the 
level of inflation risk, or market liquidity conditions. 
The inflation compensation metric derived from inflation-linked bonds may also be 
temporarily affected by other factors in addition to those mentioned. Thus, for instance, 
changes in the supply and demand for conventional bonds relative to inflation-linked 
bonds, such as those associated with quantitative easing programmes2, for example, may 
cause distortions in these indicators. Given all these drawbacks, economist have 
                                                          
2 Only conventional government bonds were purchased in the Federal Reserve Board's first quantitative 
easing programme. During the Federal Reserve Board's second quantitative easing programme (QE II), a 
total of $600 billion-worth of government securities was purchased, of which $26 billion was in the form 
of inflation-linked bonds. The fact that more conventional bonds are being bought than inflation-linked 
bonds could push down their relative yield, and therefore depress the inflation expectations indicator in 
a way that is due to a mismatch in the supply and demand for bonds used to calculate the indicator rather 
than to agents' forecasts of future consumer price trends. 
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developed an extensive academic literature seeking to isolate different components of the 
inflation expectation indicators obtained from inflation-linked bonds3. 
 
2.2. Inflation-linked swaps 
Along with inflation-linked bonds, inflation-linked swaps (ILS) are another type of 
financial asset containing information about agents' inflation expectations. In this 
derivative instrument, one of the contracting parties agrees to pay the counterparty a fixed 
sum on a future date in exchange for a payment linked to the future level of a price index. 
For example, in the case of a one-year ILS, the fixed-rate party could agree to pay 2 % of 
€1 million in consideration for receiving a fraction of this nominal €1 million equivalent 
to the increase in the CPI over this 12-month period. Contrary to the case of inflation-
linked bonds, the ILS market is more liquid in Europe than in the United States [Gimeno 
and Ibáñez, 2018] and there are not ILS markets in Latin America, except in Brazil. 
ILSs are bilaterally negotiated private contracts with no intermediary clearing house. This 
creates the risk that the other party will fail to meet its commitment at the end of the 
period, so the negotiated price incorporates the corresponding premium. Nevertheless, 
the absence of cash transfers prior to the expiry date reduces the size of this premium, as 
well as the liquidity premium, as there is no opportunity cost relative to alternative 
investments [Fleming and Sporn, 2013]. 
Like inflation-linked bonds, inflation swaps contain an inflation risk premium. Therefore, 
they measure compensation for inflation as well as inflation expectations. One of the main 
advantages of the ILS-based indicator relative to the one obtained from inflation-linked 
bonds is that, since it is not necessary to compare two different bonds, the distortions 
caused by ad hoc factors that affect the markets asymmetrically are eliminated. 
Particularly, these indicators would not have been directly affected by distortions linked 
to the implementation of central banks' asset purchase programmes. 
 
2.3. Inflation-linked options 
Inflation options are contracts in which one of the parties agrees to pay the other an 
amount depending on whether a price index exceeds (cap) or falls below (floor) a given 
threshold (the strike rate) within a given period. If the condition is met, the payment would 
be the difference, in absolute terms, between the index and the threshold. Unlike both 
inflation-linked bonds and ILSs, which give estimates of the averages only at specific 
points in time, options can be used together with ILSs to obtain additional information 
such as the full probability distribution of the future course of inflation or implied 
volatility of inflation. This gives information about risk and uncertainty around the 
expected average value. In particular, an increase in the implied volatility suggests that 
agents are more concerned and/or there is more uncertainty over the future course of price 
indices. 
As in the case of ILSs, options are negotiated bilaterally without the intervention of a 
clearing house, so prices may include a counterparty risk premium. Most of these 
                                                          
3 See, for example, D’Amico et al. (2014) and Chernov and Mueller (2012). 
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derivatives are negotiated using the harmonized euro area CPI, the UK RPI (Retail Price 
Index), or the US CPI (Consumer Price Index), with maturities ranging from 1 to 30 years. 
The most liquid market is linked to the euro area index, followed by that of the UK [see 
Smith, 2012]. It should also be noted that, as in the aforementioned case of the other 
financial instruments, option prices also contain premiums for inflation risk, and 
potentially, for liquidity risk. Currently, there are no markets for inflation options in Latin 
America. 
The inflation risk premium is present in all three indicators and the amount is the same. 
For its part, the liquidity risk premium is negative in the case of the bond-based metric, 
as conventional bonds are more liquid than interest-linked bonds, whereas in the ILS, the 
sign of this premium is positive. The counterparty risk premium is only present in the 
case of ILSs and inflation options. Finally, the estimation error may be more significant 
for an indicator based on inflation-linked bonds4. 
 
2.4. Inflation expectations from financial instruments in Latin America 
Given the scarcity of financial instruments linked to price indexes in Latin American, 
obtaining indicators of inflation expectations from these securities is difficult and limited 
to a few countries. Also, the only indicator we can obtain is the break-even rate for those 
markets where inflation-linked bonds and conventional bonds exist, and are liquid. This 
break-even rate is used as a proxy for expected inflation but, as we mentioned earlier, also 
includes several premia such as the risk and liquidity premia. We do not know the size of 
these premia and thus we must keep in mind that this indicator provides only information 
about inflation compensation rather than pure inflation expectations.  
Unfortunately, obtaining data on break-even rates for other countries is difficult because 
of the lack of inflation-linked securities. Table 1 shows the availability of each type of 
securities for Latin American countries. Even though there are several markets for 
inflation-linked bonds, it may be the case that, for same countries, it is difficult to obtain 
accurate prices, as there is either a small variety of bond maturities or bond markets are 
relatively illiquid. In the next section, we describe a different approach to obtain 
indicators about inflation expectations without the need for data on inflation-linked 
securities. This approach will provide two main advantages: first, it uses data only on 
conventional nominal bonds and realized inflation; second, it makes it possible to identify 
the risk premia component, obtaining a more accurate portrait of pure inflation 
expectations. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Unlike ILSs, where the compensation for inflation is directly observable from the price, the bond-based 
indicator requires a comparison of the yields on inflation-linked bonds and conventional bonds. The 
differences in the features of both types of bonds, beyond the fact that in the case of inflation-linked 
bonds payments are linked to inflation (such as, for example, their expiry), may distort the inflation 
expectations indicator. The indicator is also seasonal, in a way that is linked to the behavior of inflation. 
To correct for these distortions, models or adjustments are often used that are subject to potential 
estimation errors. 
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TABLE 1 INFLATION LINKED SECURITIES 
 
INFLATION LINKED BONDS
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Argentine, 
Colombia, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Uruguay
INFLATION SWAPS Brazil
INFLATION OPTIONS ----------
3. Modeling interest rates from public debt markets 
 
The methodology we implement decomposes nominal interest rates into three 
components from an affine model of the nominal term structure. This methodology is 
related to the macro-finance literature in which authors such as Diebold et al. (2006), 
Diebold et al. (2005), Carriero et al. (2006), and Ang et al. (2008) (ABW) incorporate 
macro-determinants into a multi-factor yield curve model with non-arbitrage 
opportunities. Our decomposition departs from previous approaches by extracting the risk 
premia from the difference between the nominal term structure and a notional term 
structure where the price of risk is set equal to zero. 
We also propose an affine model where interest rates are affine relative to a vector of 
factors that includes inflation rates and exogenously determined factors based on the 
Nelson–Siegel exponential components of the yield curve (Nelson and Siegel, 1987), in 
a similar vein to Carriero et al. (2006) and Diebold and Li (2006). Moreover, in our case, 
we include the condition of non-arbitrage opportunities along the yield curve and take 
into account risk-aversion. Taking these two conditions together allows us to decompose 
nominal interest rates as the sum of real risk-free interest rates, expected inflation and risk 
premium. 
 
3.1. The model 
 
Affine term structure models allow the risk premium to be separated from expectations 
about future interest rates. An affine model assumes that interest rates can be explained 
as a linear function of certain factors, 
 
, 
 
where ?????? is the nominal interest rate in period t with term k, ?? is a vector of factors, 
?? and ???  are coefficients, and ?????? represents the measurement error. We also assume 
that ?? factors follow a VAR structure (in the same vein as Diebold et al. 2006): 
, 
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where μ is a vector of the constant drifts in the affine variables ??? ?? is the variance–
covariance matrix of the noise term and ? is a matrix of the autoregressive coefficients. 
To avoid arbitrage opportunities, the values of parameters ?? and ???  should be restricted 
according to the following equation: 
. 
The consideration of risk-aversion in this framework implies some compensation for the 
uncertainty of longer maturities, in which the random shocks ?? accumulate. Coefficients 
that translate matrix ? into the risk premium are called prices of risk (??) and, following 
the literature, these coefficients are affine to the same factors ??, 
 
, 
 
where ?? is a vector, and ?? a matrix of coefficients. If ?? is set to be equal to zero, then 
the risk premium will be constant, whereas if it is left unrestricted, we will obtain a time-
varying risk premium. 
We must consider the variables that could determine the term structure of interest rates in 
order to select the factors in the model. In fact, there is ample evidence in the literature 
that the information content of the whole term structure could be shortened to a small 
number of factors. The proposal of Diebold and Li (2006) is used, with the level (??), 
slope (??) and curvature (??) parameters from the Nelson and Siegel (1987) term structure 
specification as factors of an affine model. These factors can be found in most central 
bank estimations of the zero-coupon yield curve. This estimation implies that nominal 
interest rates can be modeled in the following equation, 
 
, 
 
where ?, ??, ??, and ?? are the parameters that give us the interest rate at time t with 
maturity in k periods. 
Although including a fourth factor in the model may not be necessary to obtain a good 
fitting of the interest rate term structure, if Nelson and Siegel model is considered, adding 
the inflation rates allows us to take into account the yield curve information that could be 
useful in forecasting inflation. 
 
 
Once the affine model, represented by the previous equations, has been estimated, it is 
possible to decompose k-period nominal interest rates (??????) into real risk-free rates 
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(???????), inflation expectations (??????????) and risk premia (denoted by ??????), 
according to the following equation:  
 
. 
 
Therefore, real risk-free rates (???????) could be obtained by subtracting inflation 
expectations and risk premia from estimated nominal interest rates. 
 
4. Results of inflation expectations from public debt markets 
 
4.1 Yield curve estimation 
To estimate the affine model proposed, we use monthly spot nominal interest rates for the 
Brazilian, Colombian, Chilean and Mexican government yield curve. These data have 
been obtained from a yield curve estimation that follows Diebold and Li (2006). We first 
analyze the yield curve estimates using both nominal interest rates, and inflation indexed 
rates when available, to check the goodness of fit. For the sake of comparison, Chart 1 
shows the yield curve estimates both for Mexican and Italian government bonds. The blue 
(red) line represents yield curve estimates for nominal government bonds (inflation 
indexed government bonds). The dots represent the yield and maturity of traded bonds. 
Nominal yield curve estimates provide accurate estimates for both countries while 
inflation indexed yield curve estimates only provide a good fit for Italy. Lack of inflation 
indexed bonds for different maturities, low liquidity and low market depth make these 
yield curve estimates for Mexico unreliable. We find similar problems using inflation 
linked bonds for Brazil, Chile and Colombia. On the contrary, nominal yield curve 
estimates provide a reasonable fit for all these market and they will be the input to solve 
the affine model and obtain inflation expectations for the countries we analyze. We do 
also estimate the yield curve for the inflation linked bonds in Chile. The Chilean market 
is one of the most active in Latin America and we are able to compute the break-even rate 
as the difference between the estimated yield curves from nominal bonds and inflation-
linked bonds. Chart 2 shows the one-year break-even rate for Chile obtained from the 
estimated yield curves. The break-even rate seems to be affected by the liquidity premia 
in the inflation-linked bond market as the rate decreases during the period when inflation 
rises5.  
 
  
                                                          
5 The break-even rate includes the spread between the liquidity premium of the nominal and the 
inflation-linked bond markets. Because of that, it decreases if the liquidity premium in the inflation-
linked bond market rises more than the premium of the nominal bond market.  
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CHART 1- YIELD CURVE ESTIMATES. NOMINAL (BLUE) vs. INFLATION LINKED BONDS (RED) 
 
 
 
CHART 2- ONE YEAR BREAK EVEN RATE FROM YIELD CURVE ESTIMATES vs. CURRENT INFLATION 
FOR CHILE 
 
 
The availability of nominal government bonds for the estimation of the zero-coupon yield 
curve is different for each country, both in terms of the number of nominal bonds used 
and the length of the sample. Table 2 summarizes this information for each market. 
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TABLE 2 NOMINAL BONDS AVAILABILITY 
 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
We mainly focus on the results related to inflation expectations, leaving aside a deeper 
interpretation of the term premia and the real yield curve. We obtain inflation expectations 
from the VAR equation. Since vector ?? includes current inflation?????, expectations on 
this variable can be computed from projections of the dynamics of the affine factors in 
the VAR equation. 
 
 
There are several advantages in using this method to obtain inflation expectations. First, 
there is a large degree of flexibility, as we can estimate expectations at different horizons. 
Moreover, we can also compute forward rates, allowing us to estimate, for example, the 
expected inflation over the five year period that begins five years from today. This is a 
measure commonly used by central banks to analyze the anchoring of inflation 
expectations in the long-run. It is difficult to obtain these estimates in markets without 
inflation-linked securities and, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that these 
kinds of estimates are computed for Brazilian, Colombian, Chilean and Mexican markets. 
Also, as we pointed out in the introduction, using existing surveys on inflation 
expectations provides a limited picture, as the horizons are usually short and the 
frequency of publication is only monthly at best. Later we describe the characteristics of 
the surveys published by the central banks of the countries we analyze, and compare the 
expectations obtained from these surveys with those we obtain.  
Chart 3 shows the estimates of the nominal yield and inflation expectations over the ten 
year horizon obtained from our proposed model. The difference between the two curves 
represents the real risk-free rate and the risk premium. For the sake of comparison, we 
restrict the sample period to be the same for the four countries. The results show two main 
features. First, inflation expectations seem to be more anchored both in Chile and Mexico, 
showing less volatility. Second, the level of inflation expectations is higher in Brazil, with 
the other three countries showing expected rates close to or below 4%.  
NUMBER OF BONDS PERIOD ORIGINAL BOND MATURITIES
BRAZIL 104 Since Feb 2007 3 Months - 11 Years
CHILE 15 Since July 2012 4 Years - 30 Years
COLOMBIA 70 Since Feb 2005 1 Year - 20 Years
MEXICO 47 Since May 2001 3 Years - 30 Years
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CHART 3- 10 YEAR NOMINAL BOND YIELD AND INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
 
As we previously mentioned, the model we propose allows us to compute inflation 
expectations at different horizons. Chart 4 shows inflation expectations for the 1 year, 5 
year and 10 year horizons, as well as the inflation targeting level established by the central 
bank in each country. We can see again the different degree of anchoring by comparing 
the evolution of expectations for the 1 year horizon with those for the 5 year and 10 year 
horizons. Inflation expectations in Brazil and Colombia show a similar pattern for all 
horizons while expectations in Chile and Mexico are more volatile over the 1 year 
horizon, showing little changes over longer horizons.  
Regarding the inflation targeting levels established by the central banks, most countries 
currently show inflation expectations at long horizons within the window limits6, 
although Brazil and Colombia have experienced recent periods where inflation 
expectations were well above these limits. In fact, both countries showed inflation 
expectations above 6% before the large decreased experienced since the beginning of 
2016. On the other hand, Mexico shows long term inflation expectations slightly above 
the upper band of 4%, mainly due to the recent increase in expectations after the last U.S. 
presidential elections. This effect is more apparent for the evolution of the one year 
horizon, fading out at longer terms. Interestingly, it seems that the results of these 
elections have barely affected inflation expectations in the other countries. For Brazil, the 
deep recession of 2015-2016 have affected expectations, with a large decrease 
experienced since the beginning of 2016. The path of inflation expectations changed again 
for Brazil at the end of 2016, with expectations turning higher at longer horizons, which 
signals a possible recovery. In the case of Colombia, the monetary policy implemented 
                                                          
6 The Bank of Brazil sets the inflation target at 4.5% with a window limit of ±1.5%. The central banks of 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico set the inflation target at 3% with a window limit of ±1%. 
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by the central bank during 2016, with increases in the policy rate from 4.5% in September 
2015 to 7.75% in August 2016, have contained inflation expectations, being now closer 
to the inflation target. Longer term inflation expectations continue to show lower levels 
than short-term ones for this country. Finally, Chile have experienced a decreasing trend 
in short-term expectations since mid-2014 which has been associated, first to the fall in 
oil prices, and since 2016 to the appreciation of the Chilean peso. Although short-term 
inflation expectations remain below the inflation target, expected inflation at long-term 
horizons is higher and have experienced little change. 
CHART 4 – INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AT DIFFERENT HORIZONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 4 also provides information about the term structure of inflation expectations. 
Expected inflation in Colombia and Mexico is decreasing with the horizon, while in 
Brazil and Chile inflation is expected to increase in the future. Chart 5 shows the term 
structure of inflation expectations at three different dates for all the horizons we compute, 
giving an idea about how inflation expectations should evolve over time and how the term 
structure have changed since August 2016. The evolution of the term structure differs 
among the four countries. For Chile, expectations from the 2-year horizon have barely 
changed at the three dates, experiencing a decrease over time for short-term expectations. 
For Brazil there is an overall decrease at all horizons since August 2016, although the 
shape of the term structure have changed. At the end of August 2016 the term structure 
showed a decreasing trend that have currently change into an increasing one. For Mexico 
the situation is the opposite, with inflation expectations increasing at all horizons since 
August 2016, and turning from an increasing trend, to a decreasing one. These changes 
in Mexican inflation expectations have been influenced by the developments in the U.S. 
after the last presidential elections. Finally, Colombia shows a decrease in the level of 
inflation expectations at all horizons, with a decreasing trend over time at the three dates. 
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CHART 5 – TERM STRUCUTRE OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being able to decompose the yield curve and extracting inflation expectations at different 
horizons let us compute forward rates as well. This is especially useful in order to analyze 
the anchoring of inflation expectations over the medium and long term. In fact, forward 
rates such as the 5Y5Y (expected inflation over the five year period that begins five years 
from today) are used by central banks to assess the level of long term inflation anchoring. 
Chart 6 shows the 2Y2Y and 5Y5Y forward rates of inflation expectations together with 
the inflation target established by each central bank. Similarly to the behavior of the 10 
year horizon inflation expectations, the forward rates for Chile and Mexico are more 
stable and hardly move over time. The levels are above the inflation target but within the 
window of ±1% for Chile and almost within that window for Mexico. These results show 
that investors have almost kept unchanged the level of long-term expected inflation for 
these two countries. On the contrary, inflation anchoring for Brazil and Colombia seems 
to be lower, with forward rates showing more volatility. In Brazil long-term inflation 
expectations are above the target level but below the upper limit of ±1.5%, due to the 
large decrease experienced since the beginning of 2016. For Colombia there is a similar 
pattern, with long-term inflation expectations currently below the target level of 3% after 
the decrease in the 5Y5Y forward rate experienced since mid-2016. The behavior of 
forward rates for Brazil and Colombia show that investors seem to face more uncertainty 
about the expected inflation in the long-term for these two countries. It could be also the 
case the government bond markets provide less information about future inflation for 
these two countries. 
These results may question the effectiveness of monetary policy to anchor expected 
inflation. The results shown in Chart 5 indicate that the central banks of Chile and Mexico 
have been able to anchor long-term inflation expectations, although at levels above target, 
while central bank in Brazil and Colombia face more challenges to do so. Dincer and 
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Eichengreen (2014) compute measures of central bank transparency and independence 
for a large set of countries. Regarding central bank transparency, among the four countries 
we analyze, the central banks of Brazil and Chile were the most transparent in 2010, the 
central bank of Colombia was less transparent and the central bank of Mexico was the 
least transparent. 
CHART 6 –INFLATION EXPECTATIONS FORWARD RATES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Their measure of central bank transparency does not seem to be related to the level of 
expected inflation anchoring we observe from our results. On the contrary, central bank 
independence may play a role. According to their measure of central bank independence, 
the central banks of Chile and Mexico are more independent than the central bank of 
Colombia (unfortunately they do not provide measure of central bank independence for 
Brazil). In line with this result, Gutierrez (2003) and Jacome and Vazquez (2008) find a 
relationship between central bank independence and inflation performance for Latin 
American countries7. 
We next compare the information about expected inflation obtained from our model with 
that provided by surveys. First, as we obtain expectations from nominal government 
bonds, expected inflation is derived from investor´s perceptions, complementing the 
information from surveys which is usually obtained from the views of economists and 
forecasters. Second, we can obtain inflation expectations at different horizons and 
forward rates. Surveys usually provide few horizons, with limited information about long-
term inflation expectations. Table 3 summarizes the information provided by the surveys 
                                                          
7 Gutierrez (2003) provides the values of the central bank independence indexes for the four countries 
in our study. Although we should be careful as the indexes were calculated long time ago, Mexico and 
Chile show the largest values of central bank independence. 
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published by the central banks in the four countries analyzed. Even though there is 
information about expected inflation at different horizons we cannot get all the horizons 
we compute using our proposed methodology and the surveys do not provide forward 
rates either. We next compare the forecasting accuracy of the inflation expectations 
obtained from our model with those provided by surveys and a simple autoregressive 
process AR(1). Chart 7 shows expected inflation obtained from surveys and from our 
methodology as well as ex-post realized inflation for the 12-months horizon8. Inflation 
expectations obtained from surveys tend to be too stable over time, showing little changes 
and reacting very slowly to inflation shocks. On the other hand, inflation expectations 
obtained from our model seem to be too reactive and more dependent on current inflation. 
Expected inflation from surveys fail to react to inflation shocks while our measures 
produce expectations that respond too late to inflation shocks. The AR(1) process 
provides similar inflation expectations to those obtained from our model although these 
expected values seem smoother. The difference between the inflation expectations 
obtained from the model and the AR(1) represents the additional information about future 
inflation that is captured by the model from the nominal yield curve. In order to analyze 
the accuracy of the measures we compute the mean square error (MSE) with respect to 
ex-post realized inflation.  
 
TABLE 3 SURVEYS ON INFLATION EXPECTATIONS – CENTRAL BANKS 
 
 
Table 4 shows the ratio of the MSE obtained using expectations from surveys, as well as 
from our model and the AR(1) process, to the MSE computed using current inflation as 
the predicted future value (like in a unit root process). If the ratio is lower than one, it 
means that the expected values provide a better prediction of future inflation than 
assuming inflation will remain the same as today. The three measures, inflation 
expectations from surveys, from the AR(1) and from our model show lower MSE than 
the unit root prediction. Comparing the three measures, expected inflation from surveys 
show lower MSE for Brazil and Colombia. The model is the best predictor for Chile and 
the AR(1) process provides the lowest MSE for Mexico. 
Inflation expectations from our model provide lower MSE for Chile and Mexico than for 
Brazil and Colombia. It seems that our measures of expected inflation are more accurate 
for countries where expectations are fairly anchored in the long-run. Our measures do 
                                                          
8 In the case of Chile it is 11-months horizon inflation expectations (annual change). 
FREQUENCY
BRAZIL Daily
CHILE Monthly
COLOMBIA Monthly
MEXICO Monthly
HORIZONS
Next 12 months;  current year (t) and t+1, t+2, t+3 , t+4.
Next 11 months, next 23 months; current year (t), t+1, t+2.
Next 12 months, next 24 months; current year (t), t+1.
Next 12 months; next 1-4 years;  next 5-8 years
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complement those from surveys in terms of predictability, providing additional 
forecasting power and a much richer set of expected inflation horizons, and frequency. 
 
CHART 7 – 12-MONTHS INFLATION EXPECTATIONS FROM SURVEY AND PROPOSED MODEL vs. 
REALIZED INFLATION 
 
 
TABLE 4 EXPECTED INFLATION FORECAST ERRORS 
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Source: DataStream, Banco Centra l  de Chi le, Banco de la  Repúbl ica  - Colombia, Banco Centra l  do Bras i l , Banco de México. Inflati on expectations  in 12 months  for Brazi l , 
Colombia  and Mexico. Inflation expectations  int 11 months  for Chi le.
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SAMPLE SURVEY* MODEL* AR(1)*
BRAZIL Feb 2007 - Oct 2016 0.5833 0.8812 0.8415
CHILE Jul 2012 - Dec 2016 0.7813 0.6946 0.7148
COLOMBIA Feb 2005 - Nov 2016 0.7956 0.9354 0.8015
MEXICO May 2001 - Nov 2016 0.6350 0.7078 0.6324
* Ratio of mean square error of expected inflation from surveys , an AR(1) process  and our model  with 
respect to a  naive prediction of expected inflation equal  to current inflation. Expected inflation in 12 
months  for Brazi l , Colombia and Mexico; 11 months  for Chi le.
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5. Conclusions 
Agents' inflation expectations are decisive when studying changes in many of the 
variables shaping households' and firms' decision making. We use a methodology to 
obtain inflation expectations from nominal government bonds and realized inflation, 
overcoming the problems of obtaining expected inflation using inflation-linked securities. 
This is especially useful for markets where inflation-linked securities are scarce and 
illiquid as it is the case of Latin America. In this article we estimate inflation expectations 
for Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. We find that inflation expectations seem to be 
anchored in Chile and Mexico in the long-term (5Y5Y forward rate), although the level 
of expected inflation is above the central bank target rate of 3%. On the other hand, long-
term inflation expectations in Brazil and Colombia are more volatile and have been 
fluctuating over time, experiencing a large decrease during 2017. These results advise 
further efforts from the Brazilian and Colombia central banks to anchor inflation 
expectations to make credible their inflation targets. Mexican and Chilean central banks 
should be more concerned in reducing the level of expected inflation as long-term 
expectations seem to be fairly anchored and show low levels of volatility. 
We also find the expected inflation is currently increasing with the horizon in Brazil and 
Chile, while it is decreasing in Colombia and Mexico. For Mexico, there has been an 
important shock on expected inflation after the last US presidential elections, 
experiencing a large increase. None of the other countries analyzed have shown this 
pattern, limiting the spill-overs effects of the results of the US presidential elections to 
inflation expectations in Mexico.  
Finally, we compare the forecasting power over one year inflation expectations obtained 
using our approach with expected inflation obtained from surveys. Our approach 
performs better predicting inflation for Chile, while surveys do better for Brazil, Chile 
and Colombia. There is a trade-off in terms of predictability as expected inflations from 
surveys is less responsive to inflation shocks and our approach produces inflation 
expectations that are more correlated with current inflation. 
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